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Does "Puff" Create an Express Warranty of
Merchantability? Where the Hornbooks Go Wrong
I.

INTRODUCTION

In discussing the law of sales, hornbooks distinguish "puff" from
express warranties. Thus, according to White and Summers, "The
law recognizes that some seller's statements are only puffing, not
express warranties."' To support this statement, White and
Summers offer the following illustration: " ' This is a top-notch car'
[puff] versus 'This truck will give not less than 15.1 miles to the
gallon when it is driven at a steady 60 miles per hour [express

warranty].'

"2

A divergence may exist, however, between the hornbook
definition of an express warranty and the definition set forth in
judicial opinions.3 This comment examines the difference between
this legal theory and legal practice and seeks to correct the
hornbook notion that statements traditionally called "puff" are
never express warranties.
Three reasons exist why many statements traditionally dismissed
by hornbooks as "puff" should be classified as express warranties:
(1) A body of decisional authority holds that statements like
"This is an A-1 automobile" or "This motorcycle is in good
condition" are express warranties. These decisions cannot be
dismissed as "bad law" merely by protesting that their holdings
contradict the hornbooks. Courts, not hornbooks, make law.
1. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-4 (Hornbook ed. 1995).
2. Id.
3. The author is indebted to R.H. Helmholz for pointing out the distinction between
"hornbook law" and "case law." R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook
Law and Case Law, 80 NW. U. L REV. 1221 (1986). Professor Helmholz made this distinction
in the context of the common law property law rule of prior possessors.
The "Prior Possessor" rule provides that a possessor of property has rights in the property
superior to all the world except a prior possessor. So far, a noncontroversial statement.
However, the hornbook version of the rule continues that the prior possessor rule is valid
even if the prior possessor's possession of the property is wrongful. Thus, if Thief 1 steals a
chattel from Owner, and then Thief 2 steals the chattel from Thief 1, the hornbook rule is
that Thief 1 (as a prior possessor) may replevy from Thief 2. Helmholz' point is that the true
rule as it appears in cases is: "What a man has acquired illegally he cannot replevy." Id. at
1225-26.
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Hornbooks must follow the logic of courts, not the other way
4
around.
(2) Concepts from the philosophy of science provide a
convincing rationale for these holdings by enumerating criteria for
ascertaining what a fact is, demonstrating that such seemingly
"puff"-like statements do indeed make the "affirmations of fact"
required for the creation of an express warranty.5 Moreover, such
statements must be considered express warranties to safeguard the
purchaser's reasonable expectations.
(3) Strong public policy favoring consumer protection compels a
finding that "puff" may constitute an express warranty. Frequently,
puff expressly warrants a product's merchantability. Unlike an
6
implied warranty, sellers cannot disclaim an express warranty.
Thus, a finding that puff constitutes an express warranty of
merchantability7 is crucial to the protection of consumers. Article 2
inadequately serves consumers because it allows disclaimer of the
implied warranty of merchantability. 8

4.
Of course, one can argue that the holdings in these cases are bad law, not because
they disagree with the hornbooks, but because they disagree with the weight of other
judicial authority. Indeed, in any area of the law, a few quirky and isolated decisions may
contradict the weight of other authority. Grant Gilmore is believed to have said that it is
possible to find a district court decision standing for any proposition.
The decisions examined here ought to be regarded as more than curiosities for two
reasons: (1) because a stronger rationale supports these cases than the rationale underlying
the majority position cases; and (2) these minority cases fulfill a compelling public policy
interest -i.e., consumer protection -that the majority cases do not.
5. See infra note 13 and accompanying text, discussing U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a).
6. See infra note 19.
7. The expression, "express warranty of merchantability," is not new. It does not
appear in the Code but has been identified by commentators. See Harry M. Flechtner,
Enforcing Manufacturers' Warranties, "Pass Through" Warranties, and the Like: Can
Buyers Get a Refund? 50 RUTGEs L REV. 397, 416 (1998). See also HENRY D. GABRIEL & LINDA
J. RAUCH, THE ABC's OF THE U.C.C.: ARTCLE 2 SALES 64 (AB.A. 1997) (Example 9 presents an
illustration of an express warranty of merchantability). The majority of commentators
probably disapprove of the concept.
8. U.C.C. § 2-316. Disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability may be
effected by: (1) an "as is" sale under U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a); (2) an oral or written reference to
"merchantability" (if in writing, "merchantability" must be mentioned "conspicuous[ly]")
under U.C.C. § 2-316(2); (3) the buyer's reasonable inspection of the goods or refusal to
inspect the goods when such inspection would have revealed the defects later complained of
under U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b); (4) course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade
under U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c). Id.
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II.

"Puff"

THE NATURE OF WARRANTIES. HORNBOOK DEFINITIONS OF PUFF AND
DISTINGUISHING PUFF FROM AN EXPRESS WARRANTY

The Uniform Commercial Code 9 sets out three warranties relating
to the quality of goods:10 express warranties," the implied warranty
of merchantability,'2 and the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.1 3 Controversy exists about whether a warranty
is a promise or a condition, 4 but resolving this question is not
necessary to understand how warranties operate. Perhaps,
understanding a warranty as sui generis is more helpful, 5 so that,
whatever a warranty is, if goods fail to conform to the warranty, a
breach of contract occurs, entitling the buyer to the remedies
provided by U.C.C. Article 2.16
Unlike an express warranty, implied warranties are created, not
by the seller's words, but by the commercial nature of the
transaction. Ordinarily, because it is less specific than an express
warranty, the implied warranty recognized by § 2-314 merely
guarantees that the goods in question are "merchantable, i.e., that
they need not be the best goods of that sort, but must be of "fair
average quality . . . [and] fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used."'7 Although any type of seller may make an
9. In Pennsylvania, the Uniform Commercial Code is codified at Title 13, entitled,
"Commercial Code," of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§§ 1101-9507 (1988 & West Supp.). Section numbering follows the Uniform Commercial Code,
except that the hyphens in the section numbers are deleted, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-313 appears as
13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2313.
10. "Warranty" is "an assurance or guaranty, either express in the form of a statement
by a seller of goods, or implied by law, having reference to and ensuring the character,
quality, or fitness of purpose of the goods." BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 1586 (6th ed. 1990). For
warranties generally, see JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 100 (3d ed. 1990).
11.
U.C.C. § 2-313.
12.
U.C.C. § 2-314.
13.
U.C.C. § 2-315.
14. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a), providing that an express warranty may be created by
"[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the 'basis of the bargain.'" Id. (emphasis added).
15. See MURRAY, supra note 10, at § 100(A): "The characterization of warranties as
promises or conditions, however, is no longer significant. They have taken on a life of their
own." Id.
16. See U.C.C. § 2-711 (buyer's remedies in general); § 2-601 (buyer's rights on improper
delivery); § 2-602 (rejection of goods); § 2-608 (revocation of acceptance); § 2-714 (damages
for breach of warranty)
17. U.C.C. § 2-314(2), entitled "Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade,"
provides:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
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express warranty, the implied warranty of merchantability only
arises when the seller is a "merchant," i.e., a seller who
customarily deals in goods of that kind. 8 Finally, unlike an express
warranty, a seller may disclaim the implied warranty of
merchantability. 19
Under U.C.C. § 2-313, sellers can create express warranties in
three ways: by an "affirmation of fact or promise"; by a
"description of the goods"; or by a "sample or model." The
affirmation, description, or sample must form part of the "basis of
the bargain." Specific intent is not necessary to create an express
nor are special words (such as "warrant" or
warranty, 20 21
"guarantee").
A warranty relates to the past or present
performance or condition of goods, not to the goods' future
performance or condition.
Controversy exists about whether the words "basis of the
bargain" in § 2-313 require the buyer's reliance to create a
warranty. 22 An express warranty may attach to used goods. Sellers
23
may create an express warranty after formation of the contract.
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within
each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
Id.
18. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) provides: "Unless excluded or modified ([by] § 2-316), a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Id.
"Merchant" for purposes of the implied warranty of merchantability is defined in U.C.C.
§ 2-104 as: "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having
such knowledge or skill." U.C.C. § 2-104.
19.' See U.C.C. § 2-316 and supra note 6. The opaque U.C.C. § 2-316(1) takes many
words to say what Karl Llewellyn had originally said transparently in a few words: "[i]f the
agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." John E.
Murray, Jr., The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 DUQ. L REv. 533, 582, 582 n.289
(1997).
20. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) and cmt. 3.
21. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
22. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmts. 3 and 8. This question is discussed in detail at infra notes 125
-39 and accompanying text.
23. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7. In such case, the warranty constitutes a modification to the

"Puff"
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Unlike an implied warranty, sellers may not disclaim an express
24
warranty.
Having said what an express warranty is, it is necessary to say
what an express warranty is not. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) provides that
"an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty."25 Hornbooks have
traditionally
called these
statements
of opinion and/or
commendation "puff" or "seller's talk." Whether a statement
constitutes an express warranty rather than "puff" is a question of
26
fact.
III.

CASE

REVIEW: CASES FINDING EXPRESS WARRANTIES IN WHAT
HORNBOOKS WOULD CALL PUFF

Numerous decisions have found that statements that hornbooks
would label "puff" create express warranties. Thus, a pre-Code
decision held that a description of an automobile as in "A-1
condition" created an express warranty.27 Another pre-Code court
found that whether an advertisement that described a tractor as in
"A-1 condition" was a question of fact for the jury to decide. 28 No
error was found in a trial court holding that a newspaper ad that
contract that, under U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7, requires no consideration. Id.
24. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) provides, inter alia: "[Niegation or limitation [of express
warranties] is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable." Id. See also
MuRRAY, supra note 10, at § 100(E)(1) at 550.
However, the buyer to whom an express warranty has been made may also be at risk.
First, although an express warranty may not be disclaimed, it may be lost through operation
of the parol evidence rule. Id. An unscrupulous seller may believe that his perfect strategy is
to make an oral express warranty, but embody the disclaimer in a fully integrated writing.
The seller's design would fail, however, due to the Code's general requirement of good faith
in all transactions cognizable under the Code. U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). Id.
Second, U.C.C. § 2-719(1) allows the parties to agree to a limitation of remedies. Common
limitations restrict a buyer's remedies to: repair-or-replace or return-and-refund and exclude
consequential damages (U.C.C. § 2-719(3)). Depending on the circumstances, these remedies
may not fully compensate the buyer, particularly if the buyer has incurred consequential
damages. MuRRAY, supra note 10, at § 100(E)(2).
Third, if the purchaser knows at time of purchase that the express warranty is false, the
express warranty will be negated. RICHARD W. DUESENBERG & LAWRENCE P. KING, 3 BENDER'S
UNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, § 6.05 at 6-16.16 (1998).
25. U.C.C. § 2-313(2), inter alia.
26. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3.
27. Wat Henry Pontiac Co. v. Bradley, 210 P.2d 348 (Okla. 1949).
28. Taylor v. Ward, 393 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1981). The jury found the advertisement
created an express warranty. Id.
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described a used car as "mechanically A-i" created an express
warranty.2 9 Another court held that a description of goods as "first
class" created an express warranty that they were fit for their
intended use.30 A description of a computer as "first rate" created
"a warranty of merchantability and of fitness for a particular
purpose."31 An ad describing a used car as in "mint condition" with
32
a "rebuilt engine" created an express warranty.
Several courts have found that the term "good condition" created
an express warranty. Thus, an ad describing a tractor as in "good
condition" created an express warranty.33 A description of an4
engine in "good running condition" created an express warranty.
Another court held that a description of an automobile frame as in
"good condition" may create an express warranty. 35 A motorcycle
described as in good condition and needing no major repairs
created an express warranty.36 The seller's description of a used car
as in "good mechanical condition" also created an express
warranty.37 Assurances made by the seller of a used automobile
that its "engine runs good" created an express warranty.38
In Jones v. KeUner,'3 9 the sellers placed a newspaper ad,
describing a used car as "mechanically A-1." 40 Jones responded to
the ad, 41 and after taking the car for a test drive, agreed to
purchase it.42 Later, Jones paid the Kellners the balance of the
purchase price and took possession of the car.43 As Jones was
29. Jones v. Kellner, 451 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
30. KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 327 F Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971), affd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 465 E2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Arkansas
law).
31. Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App. 1983).
32. Taylor v. Alfama, 481 A.2d 1059 (Vt 1984).
33. Pake v. Byrd, 286 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
34. Melotz v. Scheckla, 801 P.2d 593 (Mont. 1990).
35. Bernstein v. Sherman, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Justice Court, Town of Ossining,
Westchester County, Small Claims Part 1986).
36. Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C.R.S. 998 (D.C. 1973).
37. Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App. 1979).
38. Ekizian v. Capurro, 444 N.YS.2d 361 (Justice Court, Town of Ossining, Westchester
County, Small Claims Part 1981).
39. 451 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
40. Jones, 451 N.E.2d at 550.
41. Id. at 549. The ad, which appeared in December 1980 in the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, read: "Chevy '74 Malibu, One Owner, Clean, New Tires, Defogger, Mechanically A-i,
$700.00 negotiable, 461-7253." Id.
42. Id. The parties agreed to a purchase price of $600; Jones gave a deposit to the
Kellners at the time he test-drove the car. The amount of the deposit is not stated in the
opinion. Id.
43. Id.

1998

"Puff"

driving the car home, it stalled and had to be towed.4 Jones sued
the sellers. 45 The court of appeals affirmed the holding and
reasoning of the trial court that the Kellners' description of the car
as "mechanically A-l" created an express warranty when combined
with Jones' reliance on the description. 46 The Kellners breached
this warranty when the car broke down on Jones' way home. 47 The
court discussed neither puff nor opinion in its decision.
Taylor v. Alfama 48 also concerned purchaser reliance and an ad
for a used car sold by private parties. 49 The Alfamas advertised
their car, 50 describing it as in "mint" condition with a "rebuilt"
engine. Taylor purchased the car but had difficulties with the
engine. He brought suit in small claims court and won a judgment,
but the Alfamas appealed. The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed
the decision of the small claims court. The supreme court held that
the Alfamas had created an express warranty by describing the
condition of the car.51 Taylor relied on this description. The court
also noted the role of a purchaser's expectations in deciding to
purchase a car so described. 52
44. Id. The Kelners refused Jones' attempt to return the car or Jones' request for a
refund of the purchase price, Id. Jones subsequently obtained a mechanical inspection of the
car that disclosed that the car was "mechanically inoperable." By the time of trial, the car's
salvage value was $35.00. Id.
45. Jones, 451 N.E.2d at 549. The trial court found in favor of Jones. Id. Jones was
awarded the purchase price of the car minus its salvage value. Id.
46. Id. By "reliance," the court seems to mean that the description of the car as
"mechanically A-i" induced the sale, i.e., that Jones would not have purchased the car had
Kellner made this representation. Id. at 549. This reading makes sense, based on the court's
citing of Schwartz v. Gross, 114 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
Other interpretations are possible -the court may mean that simply purchasing the car
demonstrated Jones' reliance. If this is the correct reading, however, it guts the court's
reliance requirement of real significance. In any event, under the Uniform Commercial Code,
reliance is not required for the creation of an express warranty. See infra at text
accompanying notes 125 -39.
47. Id. at 550. Although the decision does not explicitly so hold, defendants appear to
have been casual sellers; consequently, if this is true, the implied warranty of merchantability
did not arise in the sale.
48. 481 A.2d 1059 (Vt. 1984).
49. Taylor, 481 A.2d at 1059.
50. Id. The car was a 1974 Volkswagen. Id.
51. Id. at 1060. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b) (codified in Vermont at 9A V.S.A. § 2-313(1)(b))
provides that a seller's description of goods constitutes an express warranty that the goods
will conform to the description. Id.
52. Id. at 1060. The court reasoned: "Because the car failed to function as a car in
'mint condition' with a 'rebuilt engine' might be expected to perform, the [small claims] court
decided that the seller had breached his express warranty." Id. (emphasis added). The
explanation for the court's holding may be that the court found an express warranty when
puff was joined to fact in the description of the goods (i.e. "puff" ("mint" condition) plus fact
("rebuilt" engine)). The court might have reached a different conclusion if the ad had only
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In Pake v. Byrd,5 an ad describing a used tractor as in "good
condition,"54 combined with the seller's in-person verbal statements,
created an express warranty.5 Pake testified that he purchased the
tractor based on the assurances of Byrd and that he told Byrd
this.6 Two days after Pake took delivery of the tractor, when he
switched on the tractor's ignition, he heard a knocking sound in the
engine. When the Pake telephoned Byrd, Byrd told Pake that this
had sometimes happened while he owned the tractor, but that it
was not a major problem.57 Subsequent inspection of the tractor by
a mechanic revealed engine damage and that Byrd would have
received advance warning that damage was occurring to the engine
by the knocking sound when he used the tractor s The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina held that Byrd had made an express
warranty that "the tractor was in good condition and free of major
mechanical defects."5 9 The court based its holding on Pake's
reliance, i.e., that a buyer would not have purchased the tractor
but for the statements of the seller ° Pake was entitled to rely
said "mint" condition without saying that the engine was "rebuilt." Id.
53. 286 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
54. Pake, 286 S.E.2d at 588. The ad read: "'John Deere, 3020, gas, PWR [power shift],
with 4 by 16 bottom plow. Good condition. $5,000.00.'" Id. at 589 (brackets in original).
55. Id. At trial, witnesses disagreed on whether Byrd had made additional statements
when Pake and his father came to look over the tractor. Pake testified that Byrd represented
that "'they had never had any trouble with [the tractor],'" "'that it was a good tractor,'"
"that 'the only thing wrong with the tractor was that it was a used tractor, that it operated as
good as when it was new,'" and that both the transmission and the hydraulic were in "'good
condition.'" Id. at 589.
It is unclear whether Pake was quoting Byrd verbatim or paraphrasing his statements. The
court noted that the Pake's testimony was corroborated by Pake's father, who was present
when Byrd made the remarks. Id. Byrd testified that he had described the tractor as in good
condition but had never warranted that it was without any defects whatsoever. Id.
56. Id. The court reasonedL "Plaintiff allegedly told defendants that if he bought the
tractor he would 'buy it based on what they said because they had been operating the
tractor and he had not.' " Id.
57. Id. at 590. Byrd denied saying this. Id.
58. Id. "'[L]oose motion in the bearing of the shaft,'" caused the knocking sound,
according to the mechanic's testimony. Id. The mechanic also testified that "the bearing was
locked to the shaft, the shaft was ruined, and the damage could have been caused by
excessive wear in the motor." Id.
59. Pake, 286 A.2d at 590. Apparently, the court equated "good condition" with "free of
major mechanical defects." The opinion recites no testimony that defendants had used the
phrase "free of major mechanical defects." Byrd defended on the basis that the statements
had been puff, not warranties, and that, in any event, "good condition" did not mean free of
any defects. Id. at 589. The court of appeals did not expressly reject the second part of
Byrd's defense: the court did not state that any defects would have constituted breach of
warranty, but only that the defects which existed under the facts constituted a breach of

warranty.
60.

1
Id. at 590. A warranty created by a seller's affirmations of fact which become part
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upon Byrd's statements because Byrd had superior knowledge of
the tractor as its owner-operator and because Pake could make
only a cursory inspection. 61 Finally Pake's inspection of the tractor
did not void Byrd's warranty when, under the circumstances,
62
inspection could not have revealed the defects.
In Melotz v. Scheckla,63 a description of an engine as in "good
running condition" was held to create an express warranty. Melotz,
a lumber hauler, purchased a used truck engine from Scheckla, a
casual seller.64 Scheckla described the engine as in "good running
condition." Subsequently, Melotz experienced repeated problems
with the engine, which finally became inoperable. 65 In reviewing the
jury's verdict for Melotz, the Supreme Court of Montana applied the
"substantial evidence" standard, 66 holding that Scheckla's words and
conduct provided substantial evidence 67 to support the finding that
Scheckla had made an express warranty to Melotz. 6s Although
Scheckla claimed that his statements had been puff, the court did
not address how those statements constituted affirmations of fact,
rather than puff or opinion. The court did not discuss the
characteristics of a "fact" or "an affirmation of fact." Nor did the
court explicitly address the question of reliance.
of the basis of the bargain. Id.

(citing 1 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-313:40 (2d ed. 1970)). .
61. Id. Witnesses testified that Byrd had prior knowledge of the tractor's knocking. Id.
62. Id.
63. 801 P.2d 593 (Mont. 1990).
64. Melotz, 801 P2d at 594. The engine was a used 335 Cummins diesel engine.
Purchase price was $3,000. Id.
65. Id. at 595. The engine had a cracked block and could not be repaired. Id.
66. Id. at 596. Under the "substantial evidence" standard, a jury verdict will be upheld
on review if the appellate court finds substantial evidence to support it Id. The evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. (citing Flynn v. Siren, 711 P.2d
1371, 1374 (Mont. 1986)).
67. Id. at 597. In addition to the defendant's description of the engine as in "good
running condition" defendant had provided advice -and on one occasion, service -to
plaintiff when problems occurred. After installing the engine plaintiff had at once
experienced problems with the oil pressure. Defendant advised the plaintiff to replace the
bearing; if that did not work, the defendant offered "to pay for the bearings and everything."
Problems continued with low oil pressure and overheating. Subsequently the defendant's
mechanic replaced a cracked head on the engine. The problems persisted and defendant
suggested new head gaskets. Finally, the engine became inoperable, so that the plaintiff was
unable to perform a towing contract which he had entered into. Id. at 594-95, 597.
68. Id. at 597. The Supreme Court did not say that the jury could not reasonably have
reached the conclusion that an express warranty had not been made. The Court said,
however, that even if facts exist which might provide "reasonable grounds" for reaching an
opposite conclusion, the existence of a warranty is a question of fact which ought not to be
removed from the hands of the jury. Id.

896
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In Bernstein v. Sherman a description of an automobile frame
as in "good condition" was held to create an express warranty.
Sherman, a casual seller, sold a used car to Bernstein. 70 Bernstein
spoke to Sherman's mechanic before the sale. Bernstein knew that
the car had previously been involved in an accident, so he
specifically asked Sherman's mechanic about the condition of the
frame. 71 The mechanic told Bernstein that the frame was in "good
condition."72 In fact, the frame was corroded. This condition, the
court found, had been concealed either by Sherman or by a
previous owner.73 The court found that the description by
Sherman's agent (the mechanic) of the frame as in "good condition"
created an express warranty. The court explicitly grounded its
decision on Bernstein's reliance on Sherman's statement that, the
court said, became part of the basis of the bargain. 74 The court
gave no reasons why "good condition" constituted an affirmation of
fact rather than a statement of opinion or puff.75
In Cagney v. Cohn,76 a description of a motorcycle as in good
condition and needing no major repairs was held to create an
express warranty. 77 Cagney responded to a newspaper ad placed by
Cohn, the motorcycle's owner and a casual seller.78 Cagney
telephoned Cohn and asked if the bike was indeed in excellent
condition as the ad had said. Cohn affirmed this. 79 Cagney then
69. 497 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Justice Court, Town of Ossining, Westchester County, Small
Claims Part 1986).
70. Bernstein, 497 N.YS.2d at 300. The car was a used 1976 Datsun 280 Z. Purchase
price was $1,300. Id.
71. Id. The opinion does not state how the plaintiff knew this.
72. Id.
73. Id. Newspapers had been stuffed above the front wheels and coated underneath
with tar to conceal the newspapers and the frame's condition. The mechanic either knew of
the concealment at the time of his statement to Plaintiff or, as the court said, should have
become aware of this condition during the course of a brake job the mechanic had
performed. The court said that under the circumstances the facts fell short of providing clear
and convincing evidence of fraud. Id.
74. Id. Unstated grounds appear to be desire on the part of the court to give relief for
conduct tantamount to fraud which could not be proved as fraud and the youth of the
Plaintiff ("a young woman who appeared to be barely 20"). Id.
75. Bernstein, 497 N.YS.2d at 300. There is no indication in the opinion that the seller
defended on the basis that the words "good condition" were puff or a statement of opinion.
The seller defended pro se, so may very well have been unaware of the distinction. Id. at
300.
76. 13 U.C.C.R.S. 998 (D.C. 1973).
77. Cagney, 13 U.C.C.R.S. at 1000. It was a used 1970 BMW motorcycle. Id.
78. Id. The ad, which appeared in the July 4, 1973 issue of a publication called "The
Want Ad," described the motorcycle as in "excellent condition." Id.
79. Id. at 1001. At no point in the opinion are the seller's remarks quoted verbatim. Id.
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visited Cohn to look at the motorcycle. The opinion stresses that
Cagney knew little about motorcycles.80 During a test ride, Cagney
noticed a "metallic sound" 81 coming from the engine. Cagney again
asked Cohn about the motorcycle's condition. Cohn again told
Cagney that the motorcycle was in good condition and that,
although it might need some "minor valve adjustments," the
motorcycle needed no major repairs. 82 At no time did Cohn qualify
his remarks about the motorcycle's condition with words such as
"in my opinion" or "to the best of my knowledge." 82 Cagney made a
down payment on the motorcycle83 and, after he had obtained bank
financing, returned in a few days to make the purchase. 84 Cagney
kept the motorcycle for approximately a month and drove it some
500 miles when problems developed, signaled by a "high metallic
whine." A mechanic inspected the motorcycle and discovered that
someone had disconnected the oil pressure indicator light. The
mechanic reconnected the light, and it stayed lit, indicating
insufficient oil pressure.so Cagney's mechanic estimated that the
motorcycle required $471.76 in repairs.86 In holding that Cohn's oral
statements had created an express warranty, the court first looked
to Cohn's "superior knowledge."8 7 Although Cohn may not in fact
have possessed knowledge superior to that of the buyer, Cagney,
80. Id. The opinion states that the buyer "personally inspected" the motorcycle but
does not say what this inspection consisted of. Presumably, it was a superficial examination
given the court's emphasis on Purchaser's lack of knowledge of motorcycles. It is difficult to
judge how much the seller knew about motorcycles. The seller was not a dealer in new or
used bikes. The court did note, however, that this was the fifth or sixth motorcycle the seller
had owned and that The seller assured the buyer that he, the seller, "had personally
performed the bulk of major repairs" on the motorcycle during his ownership. Id. In its
Fourth Finding of Fact, the court concluded that seller "had substantially more knowledge of
motorcycle engines than plaintiff." Id.
81. Id. The opinion does not state who, if anyone, the court is quoting. Id.
82. Cagney, 13 U.C.C.R.S. at 1001.
82. Id. "Hedging" is discussed, infra at note 120.
83. Id. The deposit was $100.00. Id.
84. Id. Purchaser initially inspected the bike on July 7, 1973 and returned on July 10,
1973 for a second inspection along lines suggested by a friend who owned a BMW bike. The
purchased was consummated that day. The balance of the purchase price was $1,100.00. Id.
85. Id. The full range of mechanical problems is set out in the court's Fifth Finding of
Fact: "damaged camshaft bearings, loose timing chain, and 'totally wipedout' camshaft
lifters." Id. at 1001-02. The mechanic advised not riding the motorcycle until the repairs were
made. Id.
86. Cagney, 13 U.C.C.R.S. at 1002 n.1. The court held that the buyer had failed to
establish this figure by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
87. Id. at 1003 (citing 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-313:42, at 168 (Supp.
1972-73)). (The court used the phrase "comparative knowledge" rather than "superior
knowledge.") Id.
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Cohn held himself out as possessing superior knowledge. The court
found it reasonable for Cagney to rely on Cohn's assurance that the
motorcycle was in good condition. Nor did Cagney's two
inspections of the motorcycle prevent an express warranty from
arising out of Cohn's representations. Cohn argued that Cagney
relied not on Cohn's representations but on Cagney's own
inspections. Cohn's argument, however, confused the exclusion of
implied warranties with the exclusion of express warranties.
Under § 2-316(3)(b), an inspection that ought to have uncovered
the defects the warranty relates to will act to exclude the implied
warranties88 even if the buyer does not discover the defects. s9
Neither § 2-316 nor any comparable provision applies to express
warranties. Since § 2-316(3)(b) explicitly provides that inspections
nullify implied warranties (but is silent as to express warranties),
the Cagney court drew the negative inference that the Code's
omission of any reference to inspections vis-A-vis express
warranties was purposeful.
Consequently, the mere fact that an inspection is made does not
exclude an express warranty. Contrast this with a pre-sale
inspection that actually brings to the buyer's attention the defects
warranted against. Under circumstances where the buyer has actual
knowledge that the seller's representations are untrue, the express
warranty does not arise. In Cagney, however, neither of the buyer's
inspections brought the defects to light.
Reliance on the seller's representations is not required under
§ 2-313 for the creation of an express warranty.9° Finally, although
it is ordinarily true that a warranty applies to the time of sale only
(i.e., warrants only that the defects in question do not exist at the
time of sale), and although it is possible that the engine defects did
not exist at the time of sale, the court held that Cagney had met
his burden of proving that the defects existed at the time of sale.
The court based its conclusion on two facts: the "metallic noise,"
which Cagney's mechanic linked to the engine problems, was
88. For example, U.C.C. section 2-314's implied warranty of merchantability and U.C.C.
section 2-315's implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.
89. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) provides: "[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods . . . as fully as he desired . . . there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him;
.. Id. (emphasis added).
90. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 provides: "In actual practice, affirmations of fact made by the
seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those
goods; hence no particularreliance on such statements need be shoum in order to weave
them into the fabric of the agreement." Id. (emphasis added).
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already audible prior to the sale; secondly, since the engine damage
stemmed from insufficient oil pressure, the fact that someone had
disconnected the oil pressure light at the time of the sale strongly
suggested that this problem existed at the time of sale. 91
In Valley Datsun v. Martinez,92 a seller's description of a used
camper as in "good mechanical condition" was held to create an
express warranty.93 Plaintiff Martinez purchased the camper from
Valley Datsun ("Datsun"), a car dealership. 94 Datsun's salesman
represented to Martinez that the engine had recently been refitted
with new heads, that the engine noises Martinez heard before
purchasing the camper were normal for a Volkswagen camper, and
that the camper was in "good mechanical condition."95 However,
two days after the sale, when Martinez had driven the camper 150
96
miles, the camper's clutch burned out and the engine threw a rod.
The court used the superior knowledge test to determine whether
Datsun's statements were "affirmations of fact. "97 Inasmuch as
Datsun's knowledge about the camper's condition was superior to
Martinez', Datsun's statements constituted affirmations of fact, and
thus, an express warranty.9
In Ekizian v. Capurro,99 an assurance given by a nonmerchant
seller of a used van that the car's "engine runs good" was held to
create an express warranty. 1°° A friend of the buyer, described by
91. Cagney, 13 U.C.C.R.S. at 1001-02.
92. 578 S.W2d 485 (Tex. App. 1979).
93. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d at 487. The vehicle was a 1971 Volkswagen camper.
Purchase price was $2,190.00. Id.
94. Id. Note the contrast with the cases discussed above which did not involve
merchant sellers. Although the defendant was a merchant seller, under Texas case law the
implied warranty of merchantability does not attach when used goods are sold to a buyer
who had knowledge that they are used. Id. at 489 (citing Chaq Oil Company v. Gardner
Mach. Corp., 500 S.W2d 877 (Tex. App. 1973)). Accordingly, Martinez was not able to assert
a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Note that in this respect, Texas case
law departs from Article 2. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 490.
98. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d at 490. The court said: "The test of whether a salesman's
statement constituted 'affirmations of fact' going to the very 'basis of the bargain' is whether
the salesman was asserting a fact of which the buyer was ignorant [i.e., that the camper was
in "'excellent condition' "], or whether he was merely declaring his belief with reference to a
matter of which he had no special knowledge and of which the buyer may also have been
expected to have an opinion." Id.
99. 444 N.YS.2d 361 (Justice Court, Town of Ossining, Westchester County, Small
Claims Part 1981). The same court and the same judge, Town Justice Edwin S. Shapiro,
decided Bernstein v. Sherman, supra notes 69 -75.
100. Ekizian, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 361. The vehicle was a used 1976 Chevrolet van sold for
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the court as a "backyard mechanic," twice inspected the van before
purchase. 0 1 In addition, the buyer twice requested assurances
about the van from the seller. 0 2 Each time the seller replied that
the "engine runs good."" 3 In fact, at the time of sale, the van's
engine's cylinder head was cracked in five places."' 4 The court held
that the seller's assurances created an express warranty. 10 5 Key in
this holding was the buyer's reasonable reliance on the seller's
statements."' 6 The buyer did not fully rely on his friend's
inspections since he asked the seller for assurances. 10 7 The court
observed further that there was no "applicable written
disclaimer."108 Consequently the seller created an express warranty
"at least to the extent that the engine was 'not cracked.'"109 The
opinion does not discuss why the seller's statements were not puff
or why the seller's statements would constitute an assertion of fact.
In Elwell v. Maiko Exploration & Drilling, Inc.," 0 an express
warranty was held to have been created by the seller's description
of a used oil drilling rig as, "On a scale of ten, mechanically, the rig
is a nine. Cosmetically it's a six.""' In a departure from the
decisions previously examined, both parties in Elwell were
businesses (oil companies)" 2 and the goods were commercial
equipment, not consumer goods. Maiko contracted with Elwell to
$1700. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The opinion does not state when this fact was discovered.
105. Ekizian, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 361. The court seems to be reasoning that had the buyer fully relied on his
own inspection (conducted through his friend) no express warranty would have been
created. The court seems to be confusing disclaimer of implied warranties with disclaimer of
express warranties. The mere fact of inspection alone, which does not disclose a flaw will
not act to disclaim an express warranty although it will disclaim an implied warranty. See
discussion of Cagney, supra, at text accompanying notes 76 -91.
108. Id. at 362. This seems to be further confusion about warranty disclaimers. Neither
an oral nor written disclaimer can disclaim an express warranty. See text accompanying note
24.
109. Id.
110. 807 P.2d 176 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); 1991 Kan. App. LEXIS 145 (Memorandum
opinion).
111. ElweU, 807 P.2d at 176
112. Id. Although the case is styled in the name of "John Mike Elwell" as an individual,
rather than Ewell's company, Devonian Oil, the corporation may be taken as identical with
Elwell for purposes of suit. Elwell was Devonian's sole shareholder, was personally liable for
Devonian Oil's obligations, and was considered the owner for tax purposes of the equipment
purchased from Maiko. ElweU, 1991 Kan. App. LEXIS 145 at *2.
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sell Elwell various used items of equipment Maiko had used in its
operations. 113 One David Sears, who worked for a different drilling
company and who Maiko had hired to conduct the demonstration,
demonstrated the oil rig to Elwell. Sears was the original source of
the remark about the rig being a nine on a scale of ten. Maiko
employee James Barnett later repeated this remark."4 Following
the purchase, Elwell experienced repeated problems with and
breakdowns of the rig." 5 Elwell brought suit for breach of express
and implied warranties 1 6 and for violation of the Kansas Consumer
Protection Act. Maiko countersued for the unpaid balance of the
contract. The trial court found for Elwell. Maiko appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Kansas. In affirming the decision of the trial
court, the court of appeals held that the jury could reasonably have
found that the seller's statement created an express warranty. The
court noted the difficulty in drawing a distinction between an
express warranty and a statement of opinion." 7 However, the court
of appeals pointed to the purchaser expectations created by the
description of the rig as "nine on a scale of ten."" 8 It pointed out
that Elwell's experts were able to describe what the condition of a
rig that is a "nine on a scale of ten" ought to be and that the Maiko
rig fell far short." 9 What this seems to equate to is that the seller's
words created an ascertainable standard that had been breached.
113. Elwell, 1991 Kan. App. LEXIS 145 at *1. In addition to the used oil drilling rig, the
other items were "a Dodge school bus, a Peterbilt tractor, and assorted oil drilling tools." Id.
The contract price for all the items was $75,000. Id.
114. Purchaser reliance is not discussed in the opinion.
115. Elwell, 1991 Kan. App. LEXIS 145 at *3. Elwell employee Tom Schmidt testified
that in his 22 years of experience in the oil business, he had seen as many breakdowns
within 3 months with -he Maiko rig as he had seen with other rigs over the past 20 years. Id
116. Id. at *6. The jury had found that Maiko was a "merchant" capable of making an
implied warranty of merchantability. Id. While Maiko listed this finding among its
assignments of error, the court of appeals said the matter was moot as the trial jury had also
found that no implied warranties of merchantability had been made. Id. On what basis the
trial jury determined that no implied warranties of merchantability had been made is not
revealed in the opinion.
117. Id. at *8. The court approved the definition of warranty proffered by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in 7bpeka Hill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 213 P.2d 964 (Kan. 1950) (cited in
Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1974)) ("'[R]epresentations of fact
capable of determination are warranties' ").
118. Id. at *10-*11. The court reasoned, "In the instant case there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the rating amounted to an express warranty. On its face,
nine out of a possible ten implies a machine of high mechanical integrity. This interpretation
was encouraged by the admonition that cosmetically the machinery was admittedly only a
six." Id.
119. The opinion gives no indication whether it was industry practice to describe
equipment in terms of numerical ratings.
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THE NEED FOR A RATIONALE

Introduction

What generalizations can be made about these holdings? These
courts offer two rationales or tests to account for the holding that
what a hornbook might dismiss as puff was instead an express
warranty. The tests are: (1) the purchaser's reliance on the
supposed warranty; and (2) the seller's superior knowledge
(superior to the purchaser's knowledge) concerning the goods. 120
Neither of these tests stands up. The essential inquiry in
determining whether a seller's statements constitute an express
warranty or puff is to determine whether a seller's statements to a
buyer constitute an affirmation of fact. 121 Yet neither of the above
tests sets forth criteria for distinguishing "affirmations of fact"
(warranties) from non-fact opinions (puff). Many decisions do not
even address the distinction between puff and express
22

warranties. 1

Given such weak rationales, one wonders whether the real
grounds for these holdings were unstated: i.e., the courts' desire to
give relief to plaintiffs when relief could not be had under any
other theory.123 In the decisions examined, fraud either was not
pleaded or was unprovable; and the implied warranty of
merchantability did not apply because the seller was not a
merchant as required by U.C.C. § 2-314. Under such circumstances,
a buyer's only hope for relief is if the court finds that the seller's
statements constituted an express warranty inasmuch as an express
warranty cannot be disclaimed and can be made by a nonmerchant
casual seller.
What is needed is a satisfactory rationale for these holdings.
120. Other considerations sometimes looked at by courts, although not in the decisions
examined here, are the specificity of the seller's statement, whether the statement was
written or oral, and whether the seller "hedged" his statement. WHIrE & SUMMERs, supra note
1, § 9-4 at 335. For an example of specific language creating an express warranty, see the
example supra in the text accompanying note 2. For a discussion of "hedging," see the
discussion of Cagney v. Cohn, supra, in the text accompanying notes 76 -91. None of these
ancillary considerations is any more helpful in determining whether an express warranty was
created than the reliance and superior knowledge tests.
121. Under U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a), an "affirmation of fact" made by the seller about the
goods creates an express warranty.
122. Possibly because the seller did not defend on the basis that his statement was
puff rather than an express warranty.
123. The author first heard this suggestion made by Justin Daniels, Duquesne
University Law School, J.D. 1998.
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These decisions reached the right result: express warranties were
indeed created. However, the stated rationales cannot stand up.
Unless a better rationale can be found, these cases will be regarded
as wrongly decided or decided for reasons other than those stated.
Consequently, other courts will not follow them. This would be a
pity because a strong public policy interest supports the conclusion
that what hornbooks have previously dismissed as puff is actually
an express warranty: that is, consumer protection that is, at
present, inadequately served by a Code that allows the disclaimer
of the implied warranty of merchantability. 24 Finally, after
providing a new rationale, this comment examines possible
objections that might be made to the argument and analysis
presented here.
B.

Criticism of the Rationales Employed in the Cited Decisions
1.

Reliance

One must first examine the concept of reliance. U.C.C § 2-313
requires that an "affirmation of fact," "description," or "sample or
model" be part of the "basis of the bargain" in order to create an
express warranty. The words "reliance," "rely," or variations
thereof, do not appear in § 2-313.125 However, controversy has
26 impose a
existed whether these words, "basis of the bargain,"
reliance requirement for creating an express warranty. 127 White and
Summers say, "yes"; John Murray says, "no."
White and Summers believe that the Code retains the reliance
requirement, 128 but admit that "What the Code does to the pre-Code
124. U.C.C. § 2-316.
125. Compare U.C.C. § 2-313 with section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, which the
Uniform Commercial Code replaced. Section 12 expressly required reliance: "Any affirmation
of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the
natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon.... ." UNIOMRM SALEs AcT § 12
(1906 as amended) (cited in WrrE & SuMmFs, supra note 1, at § 9-5).
126. Prior to enactment of the Code, the words "basis of the bargain" had no special
legal significance. This make it all the stranger that the phrase is not defined in the Code.
127. The four words, "basis of the bargain," have spawned an enormous body of
literature debating whether Article 2 requires reliance in order to create an express warranty.
The 1996 discussion draft of U.C.C. § 2-313 substitutes the phrase, "part of the agreement,"
for the words 'part of the basis of the bargain." See Murray, Emerging Article 2, supra note
19, at 578 (citing U.C.C. § 2-313 (Proposed Draft 1996)). It is open to question whether the
proposed change will finally lay the specter of reliance to rest. Id. at n.280.
128. White and Summers asc "Why should one who has not relied on the seller's
statement have the right to sue?" WHrr & SummExs, supra note 1, at § 9-5. One could as
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reliance requirement is quite unclear."129 They suggest two
alternatives, both requiring reliance. In the first alternative, "basis
of the bargain" possibly refers to a presumption of reliance that a
seller may rebut by offering evidence of a purchaser's affirmative
nonreliance. 130 In the second, "basis of the bargain" may refer to a
presumption that anything communicated by the seller to the buyer
becomes part of the agreement absent affirmative proof that the
parties did not intend a particular statement of the seller to
1 31
become part of the agreement.
Murray rejects the notion of a reliance requirement in § 2-313.132
Murray's analysis begins with the comments to § 2-313. To judge
from the comments there is no reliance requirement under § 2-313.
First, Comment 3 to § 2-313 explicitly states that reliance is not
required.'-' Second, Comment 7 suggests that the parties may
create a warranty after formation of the contract.1M This would not
be possible if reliance were required. Third, it has been suggested
that a warranty may arise even from statements of the seller that
the buyer does not become aware of until sometime after contract
formation. 35 Fourth, § 2-315 expressly requires reliance in order to
easily ask: "Why shouldn't he?"
129. WrrE & SuMERaS, supra note 1, at § 9-5.
130. This, however, contradicts the suggestion contained in U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 3
that a warranty may be created after the contract is formed. Id. See discussion infra.
131. Id. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3: "[Amny fact which is to take such affirmations [by
the seller], once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof." Id. (cited in
WIrTE & SuMMERs, supra note 1, at § 9-5).
132. The analysis which follows is drawn from MURRAY, supra note 10, at § 100(B).
133. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3: "In actual practice, affirmations of fact made by the seller
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods;
hence, no particularreliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them
into the fabric of the agreement." Id. (emphasis added). MURRAY, supra note 10, at § 100(B).
134. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7: "The precise time when words of description or affirmation
are made or samples are shown is not material.. . . If language is used after the closing of
the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance),
the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is
otherwise reasonable and in order...." Id. (emphasis added). MURRAY, supra note 10, at
§ 100(B).
135.

JOHN E. MURRAY & HARRY M. FLECHTNER, SALES AND LEASES: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS

(1994). Thus, when, following the purchase
of a new car, a buyer reads his Owner's Manual and learns that the car is supposed to have
a particular feature, an express warranty exists that the car has that feature, even though the
buyer knew nothing about the feature at the time of the sale. Id.; MURRAY, supra note 10, at
§ 100(B). This result is justified as protection of the purchaser's reasonable expectations:
"Modem buyers reasonably expect to find all standard features on goods they purchase
though they were unaware of each and every feature prior to the purchase." MURRAY, supra
note 10, at § 100(B); MURRAY & FLECHTNER, supra at 80. Contrast this view with that of the
Third Circuit in Cipollone v. Liggett Gp., Inc., 893 E2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that an
ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 80
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create the implied warranty of fitness, leading to the negative
inference that omission of any reference to reliance under § 2-313
means that reliance is not required for creation of an express
36
warranty.1
For Murray, the uncertainty over reliance and § 2-313 stems from
confusing the term "bargain" (as used in "basis of the bargain")
with the concept of "bargained-for exchange." "Bargained-for
exchange" implies reliance: each party seeks something it values
from the other party; each party performs only because it believes
the other party will also perform. However, "bargain" in "basis of
the bargain" is different from "bargained-for exchange." What
"bargain" in "basis of the bargain" refers to is the parties' entire
agreement. The parties reasonably expect that all statements of the
seller relating to the goods will be incorporated in the agreement.
By enforcing the seller's statements as express warranties (whether
relied on or not), the law merely protects the parties' reasonable
37
expectations concerning the agreement.
Nevertheless, many of the decisions examined explored reliance
and found a seller created an express warranty when a buyer relied
on the statements of the seller. 138 Now, it may be that these courts
are not ruling that reliance is absolutely required for the creation of
an express warranty. Instead, what these courts may be suggesting,
is that, although reliance is not required under the Code for the
creation of an express warranty, when buyer reliance on the seller's
statements exists, an express warranty is created.
In other words, reliance is one route, but not the only route, for
creating an express warranty. Of course, if this is what the courts
meant it would be helpful if they would say so explicitly rather
than leave the reader thinking these courts have misunderstood
§ 2-313. However, even if this is what these courts mean, such a
line of reasoning does not make sense.
The problem with the reliance test is that it skirts the issue of
whether relying on a nonfactual assertion would create an express
warranty. It begs the question. Section 2-313 requires an assertion
express warranty could not be created without the buyer's awareness of the seller's
statements). MURRAY & FLECHTNER, supra, at 79.

136. MURRAY & FL.EcTuN, supra note 135, at 69.
137. MURRAY, supra note 10, at § 100(B).
138. See Taylor v. Alfama, 481 A.2d 1059 (Vt. 1984), Jones v. Kellner, 451 N.E.2d 548
(Ohio App. 1982), Pake v. Byrd, 286 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), Bernstein v. Sherman,
497 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Justice Court, Town of Ossining, Westchester County, Small Claims Part
1986), Ekizian v. Capurro, 444 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Justice Court, Town of Ossining, Westchester
County, Small Claims Part 1981).
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of fact.
Thus, a court must determine the threshold issue: whether the
seller has made an assertion of fact. There are two, and only'two,
possibilities. Either the seller has made an assertion of fact - in
which case, reliance is not needed for an express warranty to arise
- or the seller has not made an assertion of fact - i.e., the seller
has uttered puff. Nevertheless, if the seller has not made an
assertion of fact, will buyer reliance turn a nonfactual assertion
into an assertion of fact? Is it even possible (or meaningful) to say
that the buyer has "relied" on a nonfactual assertion? If this is
possible, would the buyer's reliance be reasonable?
Section 2-313(2) states flatly that "an affirmation of the value of
the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods [i.e., not an affirmation of
fact] does not create a warranty," and significantly this language is
not followed by the words, "unless the buyer relies." 1 9 Thus,
reliance is an inadequate test for determining whether the seller's
words constitute an express warranty.
2. Superior Knowledge
Under what has been called the "superior knowledge" test, courts
have found that an express warranty was created when the seller
informed the buyer of a fact that the seller was in a position to
know, but the buyer was not. Thus, the warranty arises from the
seller's superior knowledge. Thus, in Pake v. Byrd,14° the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina held that the seller's statement that a
used tractor as in "good condition" created an express warranty
when the seller was familiar with the tractor that he had owned
and operated for years and of which the buyer was able to make
4
only a cursory inspection.' '
This, however, is circular reasoning. The heart of the superior
knowledge "test" is that the seller informs the buyer of a fact
which the buyer does not know. 4 2 However, this assumes that what
139. John Murray made this observation during a classroom lecture attended by the
author in 1995. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (emphasis added).
140. 286 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
141. Pake, 286 S.E.2d at 589. See also Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C.R.S. 998 (D.C. 1973)
and Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App. 1979), which also employ the
superior knowledge test.
142. A variant of this test appears in Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C.R.S. 998 (D.C. 1973)
(the seller's words created an express warranty when the seller did not possess superior
knowledge, but held himself out as possessing superior knowledge).
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the seller said was a factual assertion when that is precisely what
the court is trying to determine. If the content of the seller's
remark is not fact, but opinion, it makes no sense to say the seller
has "superior knowledge" of his own opinion.
In any event, the Code does not impose a knowledge requirement
for creating an express warranty. Recall the example offered by
White and Summers of a statement that is unquestionably not puff
but an express warranty: "'This truck will give not less than 15.1
miles to the gallon when it is driven at a steady 60 miles per
hour.'"- This statement constitutes an express warranty even
when coming from the mouth of an ignorant speaker who is
mistaken about the truck's mpg or who has no idea and is just
saying whatever pops into his head. When it comes to express
warranties, what the seller knows is irrelevant. 144 If the assertion is
one of fact, it is an express warranty, however carelessly made.'"
A possible objection to this might be that, although the Code
does not require knowledge, when the seller has knowledge and it
is knowledge superior to the buyer's, an express warranty is
created. Again, this leapfrogs the question of whether the seller's
146
words make a factual assertion.
C. Proposed New Rationales
According to U.CC. § 2-313(1), 141 an express warranty is "an
affirmation of fact." Hornbook writers say puff cannot be an
express warranty because statements like "This is a first-class
automobile" do not make an affirmation of fact. But is this true?
What is a "fact"? The notion of fact is so familiar that it is hard to
appreciate how difficult defining the term "fact" is. Only rarely will
judicial opinions attempt to define "fact," and when they do, they
usually end up providing a circular definition. The Code itself never
defines "fact."
143. See supra text accompanying note 2.
144. The only situation in which a party's knowledge is pertinent is when a buyer has
actual knowledge that the seller's statement is false; in that event, no express warranty
arises.
145. Recall, too, that express warranties may be made by casual sellers who may have
insufficient experience with the goods to know the quality or characteristics of the goods.
146. The superior knowledge test may derive in part from a confusion of express
warranties with the implied warranty of merchantability. The latter is implied in a
commercial transaction, at least in part, because a merchant seller is presumed to know the
quality of his goods. If the merchant does not, the implied warranty of merchantability
creates a strong incentive for the merchant to correct this deficiency.
147. U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
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Falsification

The conclusion reached by the cases considered here - that
some or all puff constitutes an express warranty - is more firmly
grounded in ideas that can be applied to law from linguistic
analysis and the philosophy of science, than the hornbook notion
that puff is never an express warranty. The philosophy of science,
particularly Sir Karl Popper's'48 concept of "falsification" provides
the answer to "What is a fact?"
According to Popper, a statement is a statement of fact when the
statement is susceptible to falsification, i.e., when one can imagine
conditions under which observation would reveal that the
statement is falsified. 49 Consider an example. Suppose Able, a
seller, says, "My car is red." What conditions could reveal that
Able's statement is false? If a buyer looks at Able's car and sees
that it is some color other than red, Able's statement is false. Thus
the statement "My car is red" is a statement of fact. (That a
statement happens to be untrue does not mean that it is not a
statement of fact, merely that it is an untrue statement of fact.)
Seeing how statements commonly accepted as creating express
warranties meet Popper's falsification test is easy. Statements such
as, "This car has only 6,000 miles on it" are falsified by showing
that the odometer reads more than 6,000 miles. But a statement
like "This is a first-class automobile" might be different in kind
from a statement like "This car has only 6,000 miles on it." The
main reason a statement like "This is a first-class automobile" has
traditionally been said to be puff is because it seems to say nothing
- to be no more than boasting, a commendation. or an attempt to
persuade to buy. A buyer can easily check the odometer on the car
the seller is offering. The buyer can tell with the naked eye
whether Able's "red" car is blue. A buyer can measure the "100-ft
yacht" and put the lie to the seller when it turns out to be 50 feet.
But how can a buyer tell whether the car offered for sale is
"first-class" or not? Is this not just a matter of opinion, not fact?
For one person, a Chevy may be "first-class"; for another person,
nothing less than a Bentley would be. Should the seller of a Chevy
that the seller describes as "first-class" be liable for breach of
warranty because the Chevy is not a Bentley? That would be a
148. Karl Popper (1902-1994) was as an Austrian-born British philosopher of science
and of history who was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965.
149. For an explanation of Popper's doctrine of falsification, see ROBERTA CORVi, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT OF KARL POPPER 22 (1997).
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ridiculous conclusion, which is unjustifiably harsh toward sellers.
In fact, given the wide variety of human taste, it is impossible to
tell what a "first-class" auto is - in other words, it is impossible to
verify the statement. But a buyer does not have to verify the
seller's statement - and neither does the seller. If a buyer brings
an action against the seller of a "first-class" automobile for breach
of an express warranty, the burden of proof is not on the seller to
prove that the car is "first-class"; the burden is on the
buyer-plaintiff to prove that the car is not first-class.
What is the difference? The difference is that, owing to the
differences in human tastes (Able likes Chevys and Baker likes
Bentleys), buyers can never completely verify the statement "This
is a first-class automobile." 150 But a seller can falsify the statement
because, whatever "first-class" means, there are some qualities that
are definitely not first-class on which even the Chevy-lover and the
Bentley-phile can agree. In short, if Baker turns the ignition key
and the car does not start, or if, when he opens the door, all the
body parts fall off, or if the car explodes in flames a quarter mile
from the showroom, is there any person in the world who, in good
faith, could describe this car as "first-class?" The "puff" statement,
"This is a first-class car" has been falsified. Thus, the seller has
breached the express warranty.
Some difference exists between statements such as, "This car has
only 6,000 miles on it" and "This car is first-class." The first
statement seems much more specific and particular. 151 There is no
question when it's been breached: if the odometer reads 7,000
miles, 6,900 miles, even 6,001 miles - all constitute a breach of the
express warranty. But what about the second statement ("This car
is first-class")? It seems much more general and the examples used
to show breach are rather extreme: car falling apart, catching on
150. In fact, one can never verify any statement. Popper's concept of falsification arose
as a response to, and a criticism of, the concept of "verification" as the criterion for factual
statements propounded by the Vienna Circle of logical positivism. According to the concept
of "verification," a statement became a statement of fact only when it could be empirically
verified. ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC, 35 (2d. ed. 1946).
Popper, however, demonstrated that no statement can ever be verified because there is
always the possibility of encountering a counterexample. Thus, the statement "All swans are
black," can never be verified because there is always the possibility that a swan of some
other color will be discovered. Isaiah Berlin, My Intellectual Path, 53 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(May 14, 1998). This view undermines certainty, which may be psychologically unsatisfying
but is unavoidable. No statement can ever be positively asserted as true, but, rather, must be
viewed as a tentative hypothesis that may be disproved at any time. Id.
151. See Anderson, supra, note 87, at 66 -67 (citing specificity as a factor in the
creation of an express warranty).
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fire, not running, etc.
What about less extreme scenarios? Is a car "first-class" if the air
conditioning does not work? That might be acceptable to the
owner of the souped-up Chevy who will be kept cool by the breeze
rushing through her hair but not acceptable to the Bentley
purchaser. What about if the car gets only ten miles a gallon? The
Bentley purchaser could afford that, but perhaps not the Chevy
buyer.
Statements that hornbooks traditionally have classified as "puff"
do constitute express warranties, but do not warrant particular
features (such as air conditioning or specific miles per gallon).
What then is being warranted? The "first-class" car has to run and
it should not fall apart. To express this sort of warranty in a
formula, all that is being warranted is that the car is of "fair,
average" quality for goods of its kind: it does not have to have
particular features and does not have to be the best one of its kind
when measured against competing products from other
manufacturers. The warranty is modest, but important: the car
should "work."
What does it mean to say that a product is of "fair, average"
quality? It means that the product is merchantable, under the
standard set out in U.C.C. § 2-314, which addresses the implied
warranty of merchantability. However, a warranty created by the
seller's words (such as the warranties under examination) is not
implied but express. Accordingly, the warranty under consideration
here is not the implied warranty of merchantability but an express
warranty of merchantability. A seller who states that "This is an A-1
car" or "This is a first-class car" is not uttering puff, but is in fact
making an express warranty that the car is merchantable. 2 If the
car is not merchantable, the seller should be held liable for breach
of an express warranty under § 2-313.
2. Reasonable Expectations
In addition to this rationale derived from the philosophy of
science, Murray's "reasonable expectation" test provides a further
rationale. The reasonable expectation test "suggest[s] that the test
for whether a statement creates an express warranty should be
whether the statement creates reasonable expectations in the
152. An objection to this contention is examined in Section V.B, ifra, at text
accompanying notes 161 -68.
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parties."" ,' The statement, "This is a first-class automobile" can
mean different things to different people, but at the least, it creates
a reasonable expectation that the car being sold is not junk. It
raises a reasonable expectation that the car is a "fair, average" car
of its kind. It raises a reasonable expectation that the car is
merchantable.
This expectation coexists with an expectation (at least in
purchasers over the age of five) that the seller will engage in some
exaggeration. Mentally, the buyer will likely downgrade an
assertion such as "first-class" to "average." What the purchaser will
not do, however, is interpret the expression "first-class" as meaning
"junk" and regard his expectations as satisfied when he receives
unmerchantable goods. Concluding that the purchaser is
exchanging good money (the most concrete measure of a
purchaser's expectations) for junk is unreasonable.5
It is also unreasonable to concede that sellers do not know what
they are doing. A seller will defend on the grounds that a statement
such as, "This is a first-class automobile," is meaningless puff. Yet,
if the seller thought the remark was meaningless, why did he make
it? In trying to pass off his statements as puff, the seller is being
disingenuous. Anyone who has ever bought anything knows why
these statements are made. The reason is salesmanship, the
intentional creation of expectations of quality in the buyer's mind
aimed at inducing the buyer to buy. The seller must be held to the
expectations he intended to create. Therefore, under John Murray's
reasonable expectation test, a statement such as, "This is a
first-class automobile" or "This is an A-1 car," creates an express
warranty of merchantability.
D. Recognizing the Existence of an Express Warranty of
MerchantabilityIs Essential in Order to Protect Consumers
The third reason that the decisions finding an express warranty
in what hornbooks would call puff should not be dismissed as
aberrations is a strong public policy justification: consumer
153. John E. Murray, Basis of the Bargain, 66 MINN. L REv. 283, 317-18 (1982). The
author has not found any evidence that the "reasonable expectation" test has ever been
applied .to extent urged here.
154. In some instances, the purchaser is doing precisely that. But in those instances
when a purchaser wants a car only for its scrap metal, she will presumably pay no more
than the car's salvage value, which will entail a lower price than for a working automobile.
In other instances, "the probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged for
a pseudo-obligation." U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt 4.
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protection. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not
adequately protect purchasers. 155 An express warranty of
merchantability is needed, even though the Code already contains
an implied warranty of merchantability.
The most serious flaw in Article 2 is that it allows sellers to
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. It has been said
that the best possible consumer protection statute would be a flat
statement in Article 2 that "A seller may not disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability."156 This approach was considered, but
unfortunately rejected, by the drafters of Article 2.117
Allowing disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability
works the greatest injustice on consumers. It allows sellers to
disclaim the four-year warranty to which consumers are entitled at
no extra charge under the Code and to sell it back to consumers
disguised as an "extended warranty" or "extended protection plan."
These "extensions" provide less comprehensive coverage for
15
defects than under the Code and, also, run for shorter periods. 8
From an ethical standpoint, a swindle permitted by law is still a
59
swindle.1
155. This is not a new criticism. MURRAY & FLECHTNER, supra note 135, at 138-39. The
drafters of Article 2 considered adding consumer protection provisions, but decided this new
comprehensive commercial law statute would already be difficult enough to accept. Id.
156. John Murray in a classroom lecture. See also MURRAY & FLECHTNER, supra note
135, at 139. Whether subsequently enacted consumer protection legislation has been effective
is open to debate. For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1996), disallows exclusion of the implied warranty of merchantability in consumer sales.
However, a seller may limit the implied warranty's duration to mirror the duration of the
express warranty -typically, ninety days. In addition, the seller is not even under an
obligation to make an express warranty. When the seller does not make an express warranty,
the effect is the same as if disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability had been
allowed. MURRAY & FLECHTNER, supra note 135, at 13940.
157. John Murray in a classroom lecture, Fall 1995.
158. MURRAY & FLECHTNR, supra note 135, at 139. In sales in which the implied
warranty of merchantability applies and has not been disclaimed, the implied warranty of
merchantability is valid for the term of the Article 2 statute of limitations, usually four years
from the date of delivery. U.C.C. § 2-725. By contrast, extended warranty plans sold by
merchants usually run for much shorter periods.
159. If parties are forbidden to contract out of the implied warranty of merchantability,
will the cost of goods be higher? Will consumers have to bear the extra cost of a
nondisclaimable implied warranty of merchantability, just as they now do for an extended
protection plan? Not necessarily, because a seller will not be able to pass along an additional
cost to consumers in all cases. The extent to which sellers can pass on costs -if at all -is
a function of the economic notion of cost incidence. Briefly, the more elastic the demand,
the greater a portion of an extra cost will be absorbed by consumers in the form of higher
prices. (Demand is said to be "elastic" when an increase in price does not produce a
decrease in demand.) When demand is inelastic, it is sellers, not purchasers, who absorb the
added cost. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND EcONOMCS IN A NursHELL 17-19 (1995).
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Express warranties, unlike implied warranties, cannot be
disclaimed. Thus, the need for an express warranty of
merchantability is evident. Further, no reason exists why the
express warranty of merchantability, once accepted by courts,
should be limited to the sort of fact patterns examined here.
The express warranty of merchantability should also be enforced
in large sales of new goods made between merchant sellers and
buyers, even large corporations. Drafters may someday revise
Article 2 to prohibit disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability. Meanwhile, courts can rectify this flaw in Article 2
by recognizing that so-called "puff" creates an express warranty of
merchantability: a conclusion justified by case law, by philosophy,
and by public policy.
V.

OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT THAT "PUFF" MAY CREATE AN
EXPRESS WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY

Possible objections to the foregoing argument fall into two broad
classes: (1) that an express warranty of merchantability does not
exist; and (2) even if such a warranty does exist, it is ineffective.
A.

The Express Warranty of Merchantability Does Not Exist

Some scholars can object that the foregoing argument relies too
heavily on a small group of quirky cases. In fact, holdings that
found puff was "really" an express warranty seem to be peculiar to
cases where all of the following elements are present: (1) a casual
seller; (2) used goods; (3) small dollar amounts of damages; (4) no
fraud was asserted or, if asserted, was not provable; and (5)
manifest injustice to a worthy plaintiff (because no implied
warranty is available under the facts the court is "stretching" the
law of express warranties in order to do justice).
A further criticism may be that these decisions lack precedential
weight and are not very authoritative for two reasons: many are
unreviewed trial court decisions and because a finding that an
express warranty was created is a factual determination these
holdings can be dismissed as merely the result of the vagaries of
juries sympathetic to a plaintiff they feel worthy of relief.
Although the argument in this comment purports to be grounded
in linguistic analysis, cannot linguistic analysis just as easily be
used against it? Suppose there is such a thing as an express
warranty of merchantability; would it not be a statement such as,
"These goods are merchantable," rather than "This engine is in
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good condition?" Even if the term "merchantable" is unnecessary to
create an express warranty of merchantability, a court might hold
that words such as "A-i" or "good condition" are insufficient to
warrant a product's merchantability and that an express warranty
of merchantability requires greater specificity. 160
B. An Express Warranty of "Merchantability"Actually Warrants
a Lower Level of Quality than Merchantability: The
"Description"Cases
The so-called "description" cases lie mainly outside the scope of
this comment. 161 In the description cases, the threshold issue is not
whether supposed "puff" creates an express warranty (in these
cases, the sellers made no "puff-like statements) but whether the
very description of goods as an "automobile" or a "computer"
creates an express warranty. 162 If it does, the next issue is: what
level of quality is warranted by the description: merchantability or
some lesser level of quality?
In one respect, descriptions do incontrovertibly
create express
warranties. If a seller contracts to sell a buyer a car, the seller
must sell the buyer a car. The seller cannot deliver a toaster or
anything else but a car.
A different aspect presents the difficulty. This second aspect
recalls the children's riddle, "When is a door not a door?" Answer:
"When it's ajar." Here, however, the question is: "When is a car not
a car?" The answer a buyer might give is: "When it doesn't work."
To the buyer, an automobile is something that performs the
functions of an automobile.' 63 If it does not perform those
functions, it is no more an automobile than a cardboard box with
160. See, e.g., Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158. In E/tmer,
the seller described the computer for sale as "'a first-rate computer and would perform all
the functions necessary to be performed by a commercial computer.'" Id. at 160. This
description was held to create a "warranty of merchantability and of fitness for a particular
purpose. . ." Id. Etlmer is discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 173 -78.
161. For a discussion of the "description" cases, see WH1TE & SuMMERs, supra note 1, at

§ 9-4.
162. U.C.C. § 2-313, entitled "Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description,
Sample," provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: ...
(b) any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b) (emphasis added).
163. "'To me [said Ellery Queen], a wheel is not a wheel unless it turns.' [To which
Ellery's friend Judge McCue responded:] That sounds suspiciously like pragmatism.'" ELLERY
QUEEN, THE AMERICAN GUN MYSTERY 3 (1933) (republished 1976).
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some wheels painted on it would be. 16
Several difficulties accompany this analysis. The first is that,
given this understanding, how can a seller ever avoid making an
express warranty of quality?'6 Inherent in the concept of an
express warranty is the idea that a seller is free not to make an
express warranty if he so chooses. Second, if the express warranty
being made is construed as one of merchantability, this express
warranty of merchantability by description seems to perform an
illegitimate end-run around § 2-316, which gives the seller the right
to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability.'r
Can the statutory right in § 2-316 be nullified by a judge-made
doctrine? For some courts, the objection is insurmountable and
they refuse to recognize an express warranty of merchantability by
description. Courts that do recognize the warranty follow two
tacks. First, they apply the express warranty of merchantability
sparingly only in cases where its recognition is essential for justice
to be done and only when all other theories have proved
unavailing. Second, they construe this express warranty as
warranting not merchantability but a lower level of quality: mere
167
operability.
The boundaries between operability and merchantability are
bound to be fuzzy and should be determined on a case by case
basis. When is an "operable" car not a "merchantable" car? When it
run, but the heater doesn't work, the engine is ear-splittingly loud,
and oil leaks demand frequent changes? Difficult as it may be to
apply the operability standard, this is the compromise position
some courts have settled on.
What is the relevance of the description cases to the "puff"
cases? Even if "puff" does create an express warranty, it does not
164. This illustration and the preceding analysis are taken from Murray, The Emerging
Artice 2, supra note 19, at 582.
165. Harry M. Flechtner speaks of "general language of description -language that a
direct seller almost unavoidably must use." Flechtner, supra note 7, at 415.
166. Id. at 417.
167. Dictum in Blankenship v. Northtown Ford, Inc. found an express warranty of
merchantabiliy created by the words "new car." This warranty was breached when the car
needed to be returned to the dealership for repairs eleven times within five months.
Blankenship, 420 N.E.2d 167, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). The court held that this condition did
not accord with the reasonable expectations created by the words "new car." Id. at 171. In
discussing Blankenship, one commentator remarked: "Unlike the court in Blankenship,
others would not go so far as to infer merchantability from an express warranty created by
description." Manning Gilbert Warren m & Michelle Rowe, The Effect of Warranty
Disclaimers on Revocation of Acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 AIA L
REv. 307, 333 (1986).
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necessarily follow that puff creates an express warranty of
merchantability. 168 Instead a court might find that what the seller
has created is an express warranty of mere operability.
The counterargument is: look to the reasonable expectations of
the buyer. Did the buyer pay for a merchantable car or a merely
operable car? Often, it will be difficult to tell. Pricing data for
merely operable (as opposed to merchantable) cars of that year,
make, and model may be unavailable or may be too difficult or
expensive to justify collecting. The buyer will not always win his
argument that what he bargained for was a merchantable car.
However, even if the court construes the express warranty as one
of operability alone, it will still be of value to the buyer in many
cases. Is this not preferable to no remedy at all?
C. An Express Warranty of Merchantability Will Be Ineffective
If the so-called "express" warranty of merchantability is in
substance identical with the implied warranty of merchantability
then will it not be disclaimable, just as the implied warranty is and
in the same way? The possibility that an express warranty of
merchantability may be disclaimable is suggested by dictum in
Ekizian v. Capurro.'6 In Ekizian, the court found the seller's
statement "the engine runs good" created an express warranty but
also found it relevant to inquire whether an "applicable written
disclaimer" existed. 7 0 The court found none.' 7' The implication is
that had there been an applicable written disclaimer, this express
warranty would have been effectively disclaimed.7 2 Although the
court did not use the term, the statement "engine runs good" is the
sort of statement that creates an express warranty of
merchantability. Therefore, a reading of Ekizian suggests that the
express warranty of merchantability may be disclaimable.
Going a step further, one can argue that disclaiming the implied
warranty of merchantability will also be effective to simultaneously
disclaim the express warranty of merchantability. This occurred in
Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc. 73 In Ellmer, the
168. Recall the previous observation that a court could find that an express warranty
of merchantability existed, but something more than language such as "good" or "mint
condition" is required to create it See supra text accompanying note 160.
169. 444 N.Y.S.2d 361.
170. Ekizian, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App. 1983).
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seller described a computer as "'a first-rate computer and would
perform all the functions necessary to be performed by a
commercial computer.' "174 The court held that this language created
a warranty of merchantability and of fitness. 175 The court did not
describe this as an express warranty of merchantability, but neither
did it deem the description as an implied warranty. Since it cannot
be an implied warranty because it was created by words, it must
be an express warranty.
Of all the cases examined here, this case comes closest to calling
the express warranty of merchantability by name. However, in
EUmer, what became of this express warranty of merchantability?
The seller's contract of sale disclaimed the implied warranties of
merchantability and of fitness and limited the buyer's remedies to a
sixty-day repair and replace warranty. 176 The court held that the
warranty of merchantability created by the seller's words was
disclaimed by the warranty disclaimer provisions contained in the
contract of sale. 1' 7 Thus EUmer represents an instance of a
disclaimer of the implied warranties being simultaneously effective
to disclaim the express warranty of merchantability. 78
Considered one way, it is not unreasonable for exclusion of the
implied warranty of merchantability to simultaneously exclude the
express warranty of merchantability. This would follow from the
express warranty of merchantability's hybrid nature. On the one
hand, the express warranty of merchantability is like an express
warranty in that it is created by words; on the other hand, the
express warranty of merchantability is like the implied warranty of
merchantability in what it warrants: merchantability of goods. What
courts will decide on this issue may depend on whether they
regard the express warranty of merchantability as more like an
express warranty (which will weigh in favor of finding that the
express warranty of merchantability is nondisclaimable) or more
174. El/mer, 665 S.W.2d at 160.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 159.
177. Id. at 160. The court observed that this "warranty of merchantability and of fitness
for a particular purpose [was] the identical warranty which is expressly disclaimed in the
contract." Id.
178. Could the buyer have argued that what was expressly warranted was mere
operability, not merchantability, so that disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability
would be ineffective to disclaim the express warranty of merchantability? Or is operability,
as a lower level of quality than merchantability, subsumed under the concept of
merchantability so that disclaimer of merchantability would necessarily also act to disclaim
operability?
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like the implied warranty of merchantability (which will weigh in
favor of finding that the express warranty of merchantability is
disclaimable).
VI.

RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS AND CONCLUSION

All of the above are legitimate objections and cannot be refuted.
But the argument for an express warranty of merchantability
cannot be refuted either. There are no "true" answers to legal
questions in the sense of answers existing in some Platonic heaven
independent of a court's ruling. This comment began by saying that
courts, not hornbooks, make the law. (Note that Law Review
comments do not make the law either.)
What has been said here about the express warranty of
merchantability is not law - yet. It will become law to the extent
that courts adopt it. Some courts have already found express
warranties in what hornbooks would call "puff," but they have done
so through questionable legal reasoning. Furnishing a plausible and
persuasive rationale will encourage other courts to reach this same
result without distorting the law.
The purchaser's reasonable expectations, as well as Karl Popper's
falsification criterion, demonstrate that seemingly "puff'-like
descriptions, such as "good condition," are meaningful and signify
that the seller warrants that the goods in question are
merchantable. Llewellyn points out that, in any dispute, both sides
generally can present a case that is technically sound from a legal
standpoint. 179

179. KARL N. LLEwELLYN, How APPELLATE COURTS DECIDE CASES 17-18 (1951) (text of two
lectures delivered by Professor Llewellyn on Jan. 10, 1945 and May 10, 1945 to a group of
judges and lawyers assembled in Philadelphia, Pa.). As a conservative estimate, Llewellyn
suggests that at least four technically sound legal arguments can be developed from any set
of facts. Id.
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Llewellyn adds that presenting a technically sound legal
argument is only the first step. To prevail, a party must present a
80
technically sound legal argument that makes sense to the court.
Which argument makes better sense? The express warranty of
merchantability's technical soundness is demonstrated by logic and
case law, but what is more, it satisfies the crucial need for
purchaser protection, which the "hornbook" view does not. It
allows a court to do justice. When two arguments are both
technically sound, sense is found where justice lies.
Charles Pierson

180. Id. at 18.

